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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance 
Company, Inc. (“Applied Underwriters”), a Berkshire 
Hathaway Company, appeals from the District Court’s denial 
of its motion to compel arbitration in its contract-based 
dispute with Appellee South Jersey Sanitation Company, Inc. 
(“South Jersey”).  Because we find that South Jersey’s 
purported challenges to the arbitration agreement apply to the 
parties’ contract as a whole, rather than to the arbitration 
agreement alone, the parties’ dispute is arbitrable and we will 
reverse.  
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
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 South Jersey is a trash-removal business with over 
eighty employees.  On September 3, 2008, as its workers’ 
compensation insurance policy neared expiration, South 
Jersey, through its insurance agent, entered into a 
Reinsurance Participation Agreement (“RPA”) with Applied 
Underwriters.  The stated purpose of the RPA is to establish 
South Jersey’s participation “in [Applied Underwriters’s] 
segregated protected cell reinsurance program.”1  (App. 96.) 
 The RPA, which has a three-year term, contains a one-
and-one-half-page arbitration provision, according to which 
“any disputes arising under [the RPA]” would be arbitrated 
either in Tortola or in a location on which the parties agreed.  
(App. 98–100.)  It also contains a choice-of-law provision, 
which indicates that the RPA “shall be exclusively governed 
by” Nebraska law.  (App. 100.)  The RPA and its attached 
tables of “Loss Development Factors,” “Exposure Group 
Adjustment Factors,” and “Loss Pick Containment Rates and 
Estimated Annual Amounts,” total ten pages.   
 In its complaint, South Jersey alleges that it entered 
into the RPA when its workers’ compensation insurance was 
about to expire in the belief that the RPA was a replacement 
workers’ compensation insurance policy.  South Jersey argues 
that Applied Underwriters fraudulently presented the RPA as 
such an insurance policy.  South Jersey contends that, in 
reality, the RPA is a retrospective rating or “retro” insurance 
policy pursuant to which South Jersey’s premiums for each 
payment policy period would be based on claims paid during 
                                              
 1 As noted throughout this opinion, the precise nature 
and effect(s) of the RPA are both actively disputed by the 
parties and unclear from the face of the document itself. 
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the previous period.  South Jersey alleges that it was promised 
that it could “realize ‘huge rebates’ at the end of the policy 
term in the event that premiums far outweighed the payouts 
required for worker’s compensation benefits.”  (App. 2.)   
 South Jersey also notes in its complaint that Applied 
Underwriters is “not an insurer defined under New Jersey 
statutes” and therefore cannot issue workers’ compensation 
insurance policies in New Jersey.  (App. 6.)  Nevertheless, in 
its appellate brief, South Jersey posits that “the plain language 
of the RPA clearly relates to, concerns[,] and actually issues a 
workers’ compensation policy to [South Jersey].”2  (Appellee 
Br. 7.) 
 Before the District Court, Applied Underwriters 
represented that South Jersey purchased a primary workers’ 
compensation insurance policy from Continental Indemnity 
Company (“Continental”).  Like Applied Underwriters, 
Continental is a Berkshire Hathaway Company.  Continental 
then entered into a pooling agreement with California 
Insurance Company (“California”), another Berskshire 
Hathaway Company.  (App. 142–43.)  This pooling 
agreement was a reinsurance treaty.3  Applied Underwriters, 
                                              
 2 South Jersey bases this assertion on the following 
language from the RPA:  “During the Active Term of this 
Agreement, Workers’ Compensation Insurance coverage will 
be provided to Participant by one or more of the Issuing 
Insurers.”  (Appellee Br. 7 (quoting App. 97).) 
 
 3 Reinsurance can be viewed as “‘insurance for 
insurance companies,’ . . . whereby a reinsured . . . cedes 
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in turn, provided reinsurance to California and, derivatively, 
to Continental.  
 According to Applied Underwriters, the RPA was not 
a workers’ compensation insurance policy, but rather an 
investment instrument.  Applied Underwriters argues that the 
RPA “is simply not an ‘insurance policy,’ but rather a 
contract ‘relating [to] or concerning’ a reinsurance policy.”  
(Appellant Br. 30.)  Applied Underwriters further contends 
that, under the RPA, if South Jersey “had low cost [workers’ 
compensation] claims, it would receive a profit[-]sharing 
distribution under the RPA from its segregated protected cell.  
If its losses were high, it enjoyed the cap protection of the 
maximum threshold in the RPA.”  (Id. at 6.)  Essentially, the 
RPA would allow South Jersey to speculate as to its future 
performance under its actual workers’ compensation policy 
with Continental by “financially shar[ing] in the underwriting 
results based on actual losses incurred and the size of its 
payroll.”  (Appellee Br. 6.)  Indeed, Paragraph Three of the 
                                                                                                     
some of its risk to a reinsurer . . . and shares its premium with 
the reinsurer.”  Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. 
Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 489 F.3d 580, 582 n.1 (3d Cir. 
2007) (quoting Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 417 
F.3d 727, 729 n.1 (7th Cir. 2005)).   
 “[A] reinsurance treaty involves an agreement by a 
reinsurer ‘to accept an entire block of business from the 
reinsured . . . . Because a treaty reinsurer accepts an entire 
block of business, it does not assess the individual risks being 
reinsured; rather, it evaluates the overall risk pool.’”  Id. at 
582 (omission in original) (quoting N. River Ins. Co. v. 
CIGNA Reins. Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1199 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
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RPA indicates that “Participant is participating in this 
Agreement for purposes of investment only.”  (App. 96.)   
 For two years and ten months of the RPA’s three-year 
period, South Jersey received and paid monthly invoices for 
premiums ranging from $40,000 to $50,000, with the 
expectation of receiving a rebate at the end of the policy 
period.  South Jersey based its expected refund on the fact 
that it had “paid in excess of $1,200,000 in premiums” over 
the term of the RPA and that the workers’ compensation 
claims paid on its behalf “totaled the approximate amount of 
$355,000 over three years.”4  (App. 3.)  “In July of 2011[,] 
however, approximately two months before the calculation of 
[South Jersey’s] rebate, [Applied Underwriters] sent a 
premium invoice in the amount of $218,887.04.”  (Suppl. 
App. 23.)  South Jersey alleges that, when it contacted 
Applied Underwriters about this amount, it was told that the 
premium was driven by loss history.   
 South Jersey asserts that it paid $60,000 to avoid 
cancellation of the RPA, but that Applied Underwriters 
nevertheless issued a “Notice of Cancellation effective 
August 1, 2011.”  (App. 4.)  South Jersey then secured a 
workers’ compensation insurance policy with a different 
carrier, and Applied Underwriters continued to send South 
Jersey invoices for fluctuating amounts.  Ultimately, Applied 
                                              
 4 As the District Court noted, the calculus is, of course, 
more complicated than premiums minus claims paid, because 
the policy tail would permit claims to continue well beyond 




Underwriters declared that South Jersey owed $300,632.94 in 
an invoice dated September 26, 2012.5  South Jersey did not 
pay, and Applied Underwriters filed a demand for arbitration 
with the American Arbitration Association seeking this 
amount on September 26, 2013.   
 On October 31, 2013, South Jersey filed a complaint in 
the New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, seeking 
declaratory relief as to the arbitration provision and rescission 
of the RPA (Counts One and Two), as well as damages for 
breach of contract (Count 3); fraud, intentional 
misrepresentation, and illegality (Count 4); and negligent 
misrepresentation (Count 5).   
 On November 4, 2013, Applied Underwriters removed 
the case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.  
South Jersey moved to remand the case to state court one 
month later.  Applied Underwriters responded by filing a 
motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration in lieu of an 
answer.   
 The District Court heard arguments on these motions 
on May 5, 2014, and denied South Jersey’s motion to remand 
that day.  On August 25, 2014, the Court denied the motion to 
compel arbitration and ordered Applied Underwriters to file 
an Answer.  The District Court based its denial on the 
following findings:  (1) Nebraska law governs the dispute 
pursuant to the RPA’s choice-of-law clause; (2) Section 25-
2602.01 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes (“the Nebraska 
                                              
 5 The District Court asked counsel how that amount 
was calculated but never received an explanation, and the 
record remains obscure on this point.  
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Statute”) “sets forth that all arbitration provisions ‘concerning 
or relating to an insurance policy,’ except those ‘between 
insurance companies,’ are unenforceable” (App. 33); (3) “the 
RPA is not a contract between insurance companies” (App. 
34); (4) the Nebraska Statute preempts the Federal Arbitration 
Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16,6 through the McCarran-
Ferguson Act (“M-FA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015;7 and (5) 
the arbitration provision is therefore unenforceable. 
                                              
 6 Section 2 of the FAA provides:  
A written provision in any maritime transaction 
or a contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy 
thereafter arising out of such contract or 
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole 
or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing 
to submit to arbitration an existing controversy 
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or 
refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at 
law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract. 
9 U.S.C. § 2.   
 7 The M-FA provides in relevant part that “[n]o Act of 
Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or 
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of 
regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee 
or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates 
to the business of insurance[.]”  15 U.S.C. § 1012.  Thus, 
“[u]nder [the M-FA], state laws reverse[-]preempt federal 
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 Applied Underwriters filed a notice of appeal on 
September 19, 2014.  It argues that the District Court erred in 
reaching the issue of reverse-preemption without first 
considering whether arbitrability is a question for the courts 
or the arbitrator; that arbitrability is, in fact, a question for the 
arbitrator under the terms of the RPA; that the Nebraska 
statute does not reverse-preempt the FAA; and that, even if it 
did, the Nebraska Statute is inapposite, inasmuch as the RPA 
does not fall within its purview.   
 South Jersey counters that the District Court properly 
determined that the RPA falls within the scope of the 
Nebraska Statute, that the Nebraska Statute reverse-preempts 
the FAA, and that the RPA’s arbitration provision is therefore 
unenforceable.  South Jersey adds that Count Four of its 
Complaint, entitled “Fraud, Intentional Misrepresentation and 
Illegality” (App. 12.), “serves as an additional basis to 
invalidate the arbitration agreement, or the contract as a 
whole, without contravening the FAA” (Appellee Br. 5).  
                                                                                                     
laws if (1) the state statute was enacted ‘for the purpose of 
regulating the business of insurance,’ (2) the federal statute 
does not ‘specifically relate to the business of insurance,’ and 
(3) the federal statute would ‘invalidate, impair, or supersede’ 
the state statute.”  Suter v. Munich Reins. Co., 223 F.3d 150, 
160 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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III. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(a); this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 9 
U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(C) and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). 
 Our review of all facets of this appeal is plenary.  First, 
“[w]e exercise plenary review over questions regarding the 
validity and enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate.”  
Puleo v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 605 F.3d 172, 177 (3d Cir. 
2010) (en banc).  Second, because preemption determinations 
are questions of law, we review such determinations de novo.  
Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 166 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(citations omitted).  Finally, to the extent that this appeal 
requires construction of statutory or contractual provisions, 
our review is also plenary.  Viera v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 
642 F.3d 407, 413 (3d Cir. 2011) (contracts); Seamans v. 
Temple Univ., 744 F.3d 853, 859 (3d Cir. 2014) (statutes). 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 “Congress enacted the [FAA] ‘to reverse the 
longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements . . . 
and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as 
other contracts.’”  Puleo, 605 F.3d at 177–78 (second 
alteration in original) (quoting Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. 
Int’l, 324 F.3d 212, 218 (3d Cir. 2003)).  Although the FAA 
favors arbitration and limits the involvement of the court 
system in contracts that provide for arbitration, “[l]ike other 
contracts, [arbitration agreements] may be invalidated by 
‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, 
or unconscionability.’”  Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 
U.S. 63, 68 (2010) (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. 
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)).  Accordingly, where a 
11 
 
party challenges the validity of an otherwise controlling 
arbitration clause, courts hear that challenge.  See id. at 71 
(“If a party challenges the validity under [FAA] § 2 of the 
precise agreement to arbitrate at issue, the federal court must 
consider the challenge before ordering compliance with that 
agreement under [FAA] § 4.”).   
 The challenge, however, must focus exclusively on the 
arbitration provision, rather on than the contract as a whole.  
As the Supreme Court stressed in Rent-A-Center, “only [an 
arbitration provision-specific] challenge is relevant to a 
court’s determination whether the arbitration agreement at 
issue is enforceable.”  Id. at 70.  If the challenge encompasses 
the contract as a whole, the validity of that contract, like all 
other disputes arising under the contract, is a matter for the 
arbitrator to decide.  See id. 
 The RPA’s arbitration provision, like the 
comprehensive arbitration agreement at issue in Rent-A-
Center, applies to “[a]ll disputes arising with respect to any 
provision of” the RPA and confers “binding and conclusive” 
authority on the arbitrator.  (App. 99.)  Thus, unless South 
Jersey specifically challenges the legal validity of the RPA’s 
arbitration provision, the parties’ present dispute, which arises 
out of the RPA, is subject to arbitration.   
 We find that neither of South Jersey’s challenges focus 
on the arbitration provision alone, and we therefore reverse 
the District Court’s denial of Applied Underwriters’s motion 
to compel arbitration.  
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A. Fraud, Intentional Misrepresentation, and Illegality 
 In its complaint, South Jersey sets forth its fraud-based 
challenge in the following terms: 
35.  Defendant Applied Underwriters did at all 
times relevant hereto factually misrepresent the 
terms and conditions of its contract, so as to 
induce plaintiff to pay premiums totaling in 
excess of $1,200,000 while at the same time 
contracting with an insurer to pay worker’s 
compensation losses of approximately one-third 
of those premiums.  Defendant did by its false 
factual representations induce plaintiff’s 
reasonable expectation and reliance upon a 
term-end rebate given its employment and loss 
history in worker’s compensation.  Defendant’s 
factual representations were false, as 
demonstrated by the defendant’s admission that 
its premiums were “inflated[.”]  Defendant 
knew that it had represented and induced 
plaintiff’s participation in its contract of 
reinsurance by representing plaintiff’s 
entitlement to a rebate, and by further, over a 
period of thirty-four months[,] consistently 
billing the plaintiff for policy premiums of 
between $40,000 and $50,000.  Ultimately, 
when plaintiff was to realize its substantial 
rebate given premiums paid in comparison to its 
loss history, defendant manipulated its 
“estimates” and fictitious formulas to avoid 
payment of that rebate and to instead threaten 
plaintiff with cancellation if the inflated and 
fictitious premiums were not paid. 
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36.  Defendant has[,] by virtue of the aforenoted 
conduct, committed fraud upon the plaintiff 
pursuant to unconscionable contractual terms 
and conditions in violation of New Jersey law 
and public policy. 
(App. 12–13.) 
 It is plain from these paragraphs that South Jersey 
alleges no arbitration provision-specific fraud, but rather 
challenges the arbitration provision only as part of its general 
challenge of the contract.  Indeed, South Jersey states in its 
brief that “[f]raud is a defense that is generally applicable to 
all contracts and can invalidate a whole contract or certain 
portions thereof, including arbitrations [sic] agreements.”  
(Appellee Br. 4 (citation omitted).)   
 Even before Rent-A-Center, however, it was plain that 
a wholesale fraud defense could not defeat a clear arbitration 
provision.  Almost fifty years ago, the Supreme Court 
confronted “the question whether the federal court or an 
arbitrator is to resolve a claim of ‘fraud in the inducement,’ 
under a contract governed by the [FAA], where there is no 
evidence that the contracting parties intended to withhold that 
issue from arbitration.”  Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & 
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 396–97 (1967).  The Court 
held that, “if the claim is fraud in the inducement of the 
arbitration clause itself—an issue which goes to the ‘making’ 
of the agreement to arbitrate—the federal court may proceed 
to adjudicate it.”  Id. at 403–04.  “But,” the Court added, “the 
[FAA] does not permit the federal court to consider claims of 
fraud in the inducement of the contract generally.”  Id. at 404; 
accord Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S. at 70–72 (noting that challenges 
to a contract as a whole are not relevant to a court’s 
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determination of the enforceability of the arbitration clause, 
which is treated as severable). 
 In light of this clear and longstanding precedent, we 
conclude that South Jersey’s claim of fraud should be left for 
the arbitrator’s consideration.  We accordingly turn to South 
Jersey’s second argument in favor of invalidating the 
arbitration provision—that the provision is unenforceable 
under Nebraska law. 
B. The Effect of the Nebraska Statute 
 On its face, South Jersey’s contention that the RPA’s 
arbitration provision is rendered unenforceable by the 
Nebraska Statute appears to target the arbitration provision 
alone, rather than the contract as a whole.  This argument, 
however, suffers from the same defect as South Jersey’s fraud 
argument because—regardless of whether the Nebraska 
Statute reverse-preempts the FAA8—that statute must first be 
shown to apply to the arbitration provision at issue.  We 
determine that it is not clear that the short but obscure RPA 
falls within the ambit of the Nebraska Statute. 
 South Jersey, as the party seeking to avoid the 
arbitration provision, bears the burden of showing that it falls 
                                              
 8 We do not decide here whether the Nebraska Statute 
reverse-preempts the FAA because South Jersey has not 
persuaded us that the Nebraska Statute is applicable to the 
contract at issue.  To determine its applicability, the precise 
function and contours of the RPA must be elucidated, and that 
is a matter for the arbitrator under the parties’ clear and 
expansive arbitration agreement.   
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within Subsection (f)(4) of the Nebraska Statute.  See, e.g., 
Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 
(2000) (“[T]he party seeking to avoid arbitration bears the 
burden of establishing that Congress intended to preclude 
arbitration of the statutory claims at issue.” (citation 
omitted)).  
 The Nebraska Statute provides in relevant part: 
  (b) A provision in a written contract to submit 
to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising 
between the parties is valid, enforceable, and 
irrevocable, except upon such grounds as exist 
at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract, if the provision is entered into 
voluntarily and willingly. 
 . . . . 
(f) Subsection (b) of this section does not apply 
to: 
. . . . 
(4) Except as provided in section 44-811, any 
agreement concerning or relating to an 
insurance policy other than a contract between 
insurance companies including a reinsurance 
contract. 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2602.01 (emphases added).   
 In Kremer v. Rural Community Insurance Co., 788 
N.W.2d 538, 550 (Neb. 2010), the Nebraska Supreme Court 
stated that, “under § 25–2602.01(f)(4), agreements to arbitrate 
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future controversies concerning an insurance policy are 
invalid.”  Noting that “[e]very federal appellate court to 
address this issue has held that state laws restricting 
arbitration provisions in insurance contracts regulate the 
business of insurance and are not preempted by the FAA,” id. 
at 552 (citations omitted), the Nebraska Supreme Court 
“conclude[d] that a statute precluding the parties to an 
insurance contract from including an arbitration agreement 
for future controversies regulates the insurer-insured 
contractual relationship,” id. at 553.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court noted that it did not consider dispositive 
“whether statutes restricting arbitration agreements in 
insurance policies affect the transfer of risk.”  Id. at 552.  This 
language, while dicta, strongly suggests that Subsection (f)(4) 
of the Nebraska Statute applies only to insurance policies 
themselves, and that “any agreement” must be read as an 
arbitration agreement or provision within such a policy, rather 
than a derivative investment contract.9   
 South Jersey’s assertion that “the RPA clearly relates 
to, concerns and actually issues a workers’ compensation 
policy to [South Jersey]” (Appellant Br. 7) is not sufficient to 
carry South Jersey’s burden of demonstrating that the RPA is 
an “agreement concerning or relating to an insurance policy” 
                                              
 9 We note that this construction of the Nebraska 
Statute, which reads the phrase “any agreement concerning or 
relating to an insurance policy” narrowly, comports with the 
M-FA, which permits reverse-preemption only by those state 





within the meaning of the Nebraska Statute.  First, the 
argument fails to address what degree of “concern” or 
“relation” to an insurance contract is necessary to bring an 
agreement under Subsection (f)(4).  Second, that assertion is 
at odds with South Jersey’s own argument that Applied 
Underwriters is not an insurer, as well as with Applied 
Underwriters’s contention that the RPA is an investment 
instrument.  Finally, the District Court never found that the 
RPA falls within the ambit of the Nebraska Statute, despite 
repeatedly expressing concern as to the indecipherability of 
the RPA.  (See App. 139, 141, 148, 151, 167, 176.)   
 Faced with a disputed agreement whose fundamental 
nature remains obscure, we conclude that, by the clear and 
comprehensive arbitration provision in the RPA, it is for the 
arbitrator to determine what the precise nature of the RPA is 
and whether the RPA falls within Subsection (f)(4).  This 
challenge, like the fraud challenge, implicates the RPA as a 
whole; like the fraud challenge, therefore, the question of 
whether the RPA’s arbitration provision is enforceable under 
Nebraska law is a question for the arbitrator. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons we will vacate the judgment 
of the District Court and remand the matter.  If the District 
Court determines that the parties agree to arbitrate this dispute 
in New Jersey,10 we direct that the District Court refer the 
                                              
 10 Paragraph 13(I) of the agreement provides:  “All 
arbitration proceedings shall be conducted in the English 
language in accordance with the rules of the American 
Arbitration Association and shall take place in Tortola, 
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matter to arbitration.  On the other hand, if the District Court 
determines that there is no such agreement, then the District 
Court shall decide, in the first instance, how to proceed in 
light of its inability to compel arbitration in the default 
location provided for in the contract.  See Econo-Car Int’l, 
Inc. v. Antilles Car Rentals, Inc., 499 F.2d 1391, 1394 (3d 
Cir. 1974) (noting the requirement that “arbitration ‘shall be 
within the district in which the petition for an order directing 
such arbitration is filed’” (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4)).  
                                                                                                     
British Virgin Islands or at some other location agreed to by 
the parties.”  (App. 99.) 
